Deep Dive: Collaboration between competition and ICT authorities

25.08.2025

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Importance of ICT regulator and competition authority collaboration

As noted in Intragovernmental Collaboration, a common area of overlap between vertical and horizontal regulatory approaches is competition in the ICT sector. As such, competition and ICT regulators often work together to achieve common goals in line with their mandates. In some cases, cooperation tools are envisaged in legislation, other times agencies frame them in formal agreements, such as MOUs/MOAs, and in other cases regulators choose to cooperate informally. Often, informal cooperation is the precursor to future – and formal – cooperation.

Collaboration between ICT and competition regulators is a common and critical intersection of regulatory responsibilities with significant potential to simplify and clarify the regulatory framework in the ICT sector. As ICT service providers enter the market and factors including the market, technology, business strategies, and consumer preferences evolve on an ongoing basis, competition between service providers – and sometimes services – also evolves. Collaboration between ICT and competition regulators can allow the authorities to monitor sector changes, identify and share information regarding notable behaviors and trends, and ensure a continued clear approach to dividing responsibilities or coordinating activities. As a result, collaborative approaches can not only enable regulators to correctly focus their efforts, but also provide clarity to service providers and other stakeholders with regard to rules and enforcement. This type of regulatory certainty is an important prerequisite for investment and innovation, particularly in a sector with substantial infrastructure and resource costs.

Collaboration between authorities, however, can generate friction, political and technical tensions, and overlaps of competences. Regulators can use different mechanisms or methods to try to avoid or solve conflicts, such as referring to a specific law or regulation, defining relationships through formal or informal agreements, and including in their annual engagements less-formal events, such as conferences and meetings (European Union 2022).

Potential for overlapping responsibilities

Competition regulators often have a broad mandate including competition matters across all sectors, while ICT regulators have a more specific mandate limited to the ICT sector. Usually, the competition authority – with a horizontal focus on all competition matters across several sectors – operates on a case-by-case basis after an infringement occurs, while the ICT regulator is vertically focused to implement and enforce ex-ante rules. For example, in Jamaica the Telecommunications Act and the Office of Utilities Regulation Act empower and require the Office of Utilities Regulation to promote competition, including ex ante regulation related to fair and non-discriminatory terms for interconnection as well as access to essential facilities and price controls (Jamaica Government 2000, Jamaica Government 1995). Jamaica’s Fair Competition Act establishes duties for the Fair Trading Commission that include investigating ex post anti-competitive conduct (Jamaica Government 1993). Similarly, in the Philippines the National Telecommunications Commission is responsible for promoting fair competition and plays a key role in ex ante competition enforcement through its oversight of interconnection agreements, spectrum management, and licensing (Philippines Government 1995). The Philippine Competition Commission enforces competition across the economy, including investigation of anti-competitive agreements and activity, abuse of dominance, and merger control, including in the telecommunications sector (Philippines Government 2015).

In other cases, the applicable laws explicitly delegate competition matters in the telecommunications sector to the sector regulator rather than the telecommunications authority. For example, in Trinidad and Tobago, the Fair Trading Act explicitly states that its provisions are not applicable to companies governed by telecommunications legislation or banking legislation (Trinidad and Tobago Government 2006). Thus the Trinidad and Tobago Fair Trading Commission does not have jurisdiction over competition matters in the telecommunications sector, including ex post enforcement. In addition, the Telecommunications Act empowers the Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago to take action with regard to competition, including price regulation, assessment of dominance, and regulating interconnection and access to facilities, as well as ex post regulatory activities such as investigations and the imposition of sanctions (Trinidad and Tobago Government 2001).

Providing clarity on how the ICT regulator will achieve its objectives and how these relate to the goals of the competition authority can help to ensure smoother cooperation between the two bodies (BIAC 2022). A lack of clarity regarding the respective goals of agencies might lead to conflicting outcomes and duplication of costs. For example, according to media reports, in the summer of 2017 in South Africa both ICASA and the Competition Commission announced separate inquiries into data prices (Webber Wentzel 2017).

Conflicting or unclear legal provisions may also generate confusion with respect to the competition-related duties of ICT and competition authorities. For example, the Indian TRAI Act mandates that the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) take measures to “facilitate competition” and “promote efficiency in the operation of telecommunications services,” de facto overlapping with the competition authority’s mandate (India Government 1997).

In such cases, specific clauses may determine how to proceed when a potential conflict might arise between a competition authority and a sector regulator (Box 1).

Box 1. Example of case reference in front of the Indian competition commission

Example of clause contained in the Indian Competition Act, 2002Reference by Commission.

(1) Where in the course of a proceeding before the Commission an issue is raised by any party that any decision which, the Commission has taken during such proceeding or proposes to take, is or would be contrary to any provision of this Act whose implementation is entrusted to a statutory authority, then the Commission may make a reference in respect of such issue to the statutory authority:

Provided that the Commission may, suo motu, make such a reference to the statutory authority.

(2) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (1), the statutory authority shall give its opinion, within sixty days of receipt of such reference, to the Commission which shall consider the opinion of the statutory authority, and thereafter give its findings recoding reasons therefor on the issues referred to in the said opinion.

Source: India Government 2002

Mitigating friction and uncertainty

Cooperation mechanisms established by law

Cooperation between the competition and ICT regulators may be regulated by a general framework enshrined in law. This approach facilitates a consistent guiding principle in the long term and avoids inconsistent outcomes (European Union 2022). Such laws can include provisions clarifying the authorities’ roles, competencies, and modes of interaction. In some cases, the legislative text instructing a competition regulator on how to address potential conflicts with the ICT regulator (or other regulatory agencies) is included in the law that establishes and empowers the competition regulator (Box 2).

Box 2. Example of law requiring competition regulator to negotiate agreements with sector-specific regulators

Example of general provision on the roles of the regulatory agenciesThe competition commission is responsible to: […]

negotiate agreements with any regulatory authority to co-ordinate and harmonise the exercise of jurisdiction over competition matters within the relevant industry or sector. and to ensure the consistent application of the principles of this Act;
participate in the proceedings of any regulatory authority;
advise, and receive advice from any regulatory authority.

Source: South Africa Government 1998

Similarly, the legal framework may include provisions on how to avoid double jeopardy, or the imposition of remedies or other actions by multiple regulators in response to the same behavior or action. Specifically, legal provisions may require the relevant regulatory authorities to agree on the path forward (Box 3)

Box 3. Example of clause to avoid double jeopardy

(1) Where two or more competent persons may have concurrent jurisdiction to exercise Part 1 functions in respect of a case, no competent person shall exercise any prescribed functions in respect of that case before agreement has been reached in accordance with regulation 4(2) or a determination has been made in accordance with regulation 5(3)(a) as to which competent person is to exercise Part 1 functions in respect of that case.

(2) Subject to regulations 7 and 8, once agreement has been reached in accordance with regulation 4(2) or a determination has been made in accordance with regulation 5(3)(a) as to which competent person is to exercise Part 1 functions in respect of a case, no other competent person shall exercise any Part 1 functions in respect of that case.

Source: United Kingdom Government 2014

Applicable law may also include provisions on how to transfer competences between the authorities, including pre-determined timelines, exchange of documents, means of communication, and how to reach a final decision. (Box 4)

Box 4. Example of transfer clause

A competent person who has exercised any Part 1 functions in respect of a case (“the transferor”) may agree with another competent person who but for regulation 6 would have, concurrent jurisdiction to exercise Part 1 functions in respect of that case (“the transferee”) to transfer the case to the transferee.
If the transferor and the transferee propose to agree a transfer in accordance with paragraph (1), the transferor must first—
notify the undertaking which is the subject of the exercise of Part 1 functions in that case (the undertaking concerned) and any other person likely to be materially affected by the transfer, of the proposed transfer, and
give such recipients of the notice the opportunity to make written representations upon the proposal within no less than 10 working days of the date of that notice.
The transferor and transferee must take into account any written representations made in accordance with paragraph (2)(b) before agreeing the transfer.
Once the transferor and transferee have reached a decision about the proposed transfer, the transferor must—
inform the recipients of the notice under paragraph (2) in writing of their decision and the reasons for it, and
if the transfer has been agreed that the transferee is to exercise jurisdiction in respect of the case from the date of the transfer.
The transferor is not under any obligation to notify any person in accordance with paragraph (2) or to inform any person in accordance with paragraph (4) if the transferor has not informed that person that it has exercised Part 1 functions in respect of the case.

Source: United Kingdom Government 2014

Relationships defined by formal and informal agreements

Competition and ICT regulators might decide to cooperate on a voluntary basis—or as required by law—with a formal agreement such as an MOU or MOA. As discussed in Deep dive: Common elements of collaboration agreements between agencies, the status of such agreements as legally binding and the breadth of their scope vary. Such agreements are highly tailorable, with the signatories potentially deciding on the scope, duration, responsibilities, economic engagement, and procedures.

The regulators might also decide to enter into an informal agreement that will result in a non-legally binding decision that may be formalized at a later date. Competition authorities and ICT authorities might use less formal arrangements to develop their relationships and to reinforce their collaboration in the long term. This may include, for example, organizing or participating in forums and conferences, conducting strategic dialogues, and sharing informal opinions (BIAC 2022).

In another example of informal collaboration between competition and ICT regulators, the competition authority may take actions such as publishing studies or opinions that include specific recommendations relevant to the communications regulator (Box 5).

Box 5. Example of competition regulator recommendation included in report

We strongly support Ofcom’s existing initiative to make more data available for use by third parties like [digital comparison tools, DCTs], including using its Digital Economy Act powers.
Pending any legislative change, we recommend that regulators consider a number of improvements to the voluntary schemes in energy and telecoms –particularly removing the most distorting requirements such as on coverage –and in general paring back the more prescriptive requirements.
We recommend Ofcom consider how else it might support the further development of DCTs in telecoms as a way of enabling better competition and consumer choice.

Source: CMA 2017

The authorities might also seek to reinforce their relationships through staff exchange programs, allowing the institution of a secondment program to improve the knowledge of both fields and to facilitate communications between the authorities (European Union 2022).

References

Business at OECD (BIAC). 2022. Interactions between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2022)64/en/pdf.

Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). 2017. Digital comparison tools market study – Final report at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/59c93546e5274a77468120d6/digital-comparison-tools-market-study-final-report.pdf.

European Union. 2022. Interactions Between Competition Authorities and Sector Regulators at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2022)13/en/pdf.

India Government. 1997. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act at https://trai.gov.in/sites/default/files/2024-10/The_TRAI_Act_1997.pdf.

India Government. 2002. Competition Act at https://cci.gov.in/images/legalframeworkact/en/the-competition-act-20021652103427.pdf.

Jamaica Government. 1993. Fair Competition Act of 1993. https://laws.moj.gov.jm/library/statute/the-fair-competition-act.

Jamaica Government. 1995. Office of Utilities Regulation Act. https://laws.moj.gov.jm/library/statute/the-office-of-utilities-regulation-act.

Jamaica Government. 2000. The Telecommunications Act. https://laws.moj.gov.jm/library/statute/the-telecommunications-act.

Philippines Government. 1995. Public Telecommunications Policy Act. https://ntc.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/LawsRulesRegulations/RAs_PDs_EOs/RA_7925.pdf.

Philippines Government. 2015. Philippine Competition Act. https://www.phcc.gov.ph/file-manager/1/Philippine%20Competition%20Act/Philippine-Competition-Act-PCA-1.pdf.

South Africa Government. 1998. Competition Act, 1998 – Act No. 89 at https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/a89-98.pdf.

Trinidad and Tobago Government. 2001. Telecommunications Act. https://tatt.org.tt/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Telecommunications-Act-Chap.-47.31-2022.pdf.

Trinidad and Tobago Government. 2006. Fair Trading Act. https://tandtftc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Fair-Trading-Act-2006.pdf.

United Kingdom Government. 2014. The Competition Act 1998 (Concurrency) Regulations 2014 at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/536/regulation/6.

Webber Wentzel. 2017. Data costs must fall – Competition Commission joins ICASA in war at https://www.polity.org.za/article/data-costs-must-fall—competition-commission-joins-icasa-in-war-2017-09-28.

Last updated on: 01.09.2025

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